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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
tion. Instead it reapplied the rule of thirty years ago, that airports
are not one of those purposes which may be considered "necessary"
within the meaning of article VII, section 6.
In Goswick v. Durham, the first of the "airport cases," the
opinion noted that "The law is an expanding science, designed to
march with the advancing battalions of life and progress and to
safeguard and interpret the changing needs of a commonwealth or
community."" 6 It is questionable whether the court in Royster has
stayed in step with those battalions.
WILLIAM VANN MCPHERSON, JR.
Securities Regulations-Convertible Debentures Not
A Class of Equity Security
In Chemical Fund, Inc. v. Xerox Corp.,' the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals was for the second time2 faced with construing
the meaning of "any class of any equity security" in section 161 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Chemical Fund is an open
end diversified investment company. Early in December 1962, the
Fund owned 91,000 shares which represented 2.36 percent of the
Xerox common stock.' In 1961 the Fund acquired four and one
50 211 N.C. at 690, 191 S.E. at 730.
'377 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1967).
'In Ellerin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 270 F.2d 259 (2d Cir.
1959), the court held that the ten percent holder of a series of stock was
not the ten percent holder of a class of equity security for the purposes of
section 16(b).
' Section 16(a) of the statute defines insider for the purposes of the
statute as "Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner
of more than ten percentum of any class of any equity security ...or who
is a director or an officer of the issuer of such security. . . ." Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1964). The section under con-
sideration in the principal case reads:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may
have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by
reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from
any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security
of such issuer (other than an exempted security) within any period
of less than six months, unless such security was acquired in good faith
in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be
recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of
such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering into such trans-
action of holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing the
security sold for a period exceeding six months. ...
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
'At that time Xerox had 3,851,844 shares of common stock outstanding.
Chemical Fund, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 377 F.2d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 1967).
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half percent convertible subordinate debentures due May 1, 1981.
Each 1,000 dollar debenture was convertible into approximately nine
and one half shares of common stock and was protected against dilu-
tion of the conversion right, but carried no immediate participation
in the equity of Xerox. From December 4 through 20, 1962 and
again from April 24 through August 2, 1963, the Fund purchased
debentures convertible into 3,029 shares of common and sold 3,000
shares of common stock. Besides this sale of 3,000 shares offset
by the purchase of debentures, the Fund sold an additional 13,500
shares of common. These purchases and sales were part of a pro-
gram designed to increase Chemical Fund's secured position and
improve its yield from its Xerox investment without sacrificing its
ability to take advantage of the continuing appreciation of Xerox
common stock. With the purchase of 11,000 dollars principal amount
of debentures on December 4 and again on December 12, 1962, how-
ever, Chemical Fund became the holder of more than ten percent
of the outstanding convertible debentures, a position it held until
November, 1963.' As a result, Chemical Fund sought declaratory
judgment in the district court as to whether the profits made from
the sales of common stock and purchases of debentures between
December 1962 and November 1963 would inure to Xerox as a vio-
lation of section 16(b). The district court granted summary judg-
ment to Xerox for 153,922.43 dollars without interest.
On appeal the court of appeals reversed, holding that Chemical
Fund was not liable under section 16(b) for short swing profits
as a beneficial owner of ten percent of "any class of any equity
security," for had Chemical Fund converted its debentures, it would
have commanded only 2.72 percent of the Xerox common stock.
Reasoning that a convertible debenture is an "equity security" only
because of its convertible nature, the court held that the debentures
alone would not be a "class of equity security."8 According to the
court, the holder of convertible debentures would not normally have
standing with officers, directors or large stockholders to be the re-
cipient of inside information.' Consequently, Chemical Fund would
be outside the purview of the statute, for, as the court states, "the
'The Fund continued to hold more than ten percent of the convertible
debentures until November 22, 1963, when pursuant to a call for redemption
it converted the debentures into 17,180.95 shares of common stock. Id.
o 377 F.2d at 111.
7Id.
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purpose of section 16 to impose liability on the basis of actual or
potential control is clear, and we should give it effect.""
By exempting the holder of ten percent of the convertible de-
bentures, it is questionable whether the court gave effect to the
stated purpose of the statute-to prevent the unfair use of inside
information.9 The court based its decision on control and seemed
to equate "control" for the purposes of section 16(b) with ownership
of ten percent of the common stock. This note is thus directed to
the question of whether ownership of ten percent of the underlying
common stock is necessary for the convertible debenture holder to
be party to the abuses which 16(b) was designed to prevent.
At the time the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was passed,
"profits from 'sure thing' speculation were regarded by members of
the financial community as one of the usual emoluments of office."' 0
As cases indicate, the entire purpose of section 16(b) is "to dis-
courage corporate insiders from trading for short swing profits on
the basis of information about corporate circumstances, plans and
prospects not available to the public,"" and "to establish a standard
so high as to prevent any conflict between the selfish interest of a
fiduciary officer, director, or stockholder and the faithful perfor-
mance of his duty. 11 2  To put teeth into the statute Congress re-
quired that profits made on short swing-six months-transactions
be forfeited to the corporation. Congress indicated its desire to
minimize misuse of confidential information, without unduly dis-
couraging bona fide long term investment, by basing forfeiture of
profits on the length of the insider's investment commitment.13 The
statute is remedial in operation, and regardless of whether the in-
8 Id.
'Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
10 Cook and Feldman, Inider Trading Under the Securities Exchange
Act, 66 HARV. L. REv. 385, 386 (1953) [Hereinafter cited as Cook].
" Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156, 172 (3d Cir. 1965).
12 Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir. 1943); see
Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006
(1966) (In this case the court commented that "[airned with information
not available to ordinary stockholders, these 'insiders' brought about artificial,
but predictable, fluctuations in the market and, in so doing, were able to reap
substantial profit with little or no investment risks to themselves-all at the
expense of outside stockholders. . . ." 367 F.2d at 352) ; Perfect Photo, Inc.
v. Grable, 205 F. Supp. 569, 571 (1962).
1 Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 892 (1965). In this decision the court pointed out that confidential
information is valuable for just a short period and that the attractiveness of
trading is enhanced if the capital is invested for only a short time. 342 F.2d
at 308.
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sider actually uses information, he must forfeit profits from short
term speculation. 14
On the issue of whether convertible debentures are a "class of
equity security"' 5 Chemical Fund was a case of first impression.
However, an examination of the Second Circuit's interpretation of
16(b) in relation to other issues such as conversion as a purchase
and sale, recapitalization, and stock options reveals an interesting
trend in the court's attitude toward and application of this seemingly
absolute, arbitrary statute. When the court first interpreted the
rule in Smolowe v. Delendo Corp.'6 and later in Park & Tilford v.
Shulte, Inc.,' 7 it adhered to the idea that the statute was an abso-
lute "crude rule of thumb."'" There was little consideration of
surrounding factors which might justify or delimit the application
of this somewhat harsh rule. The fact that the Shulte brothers in
Park & Tilford could have prevented the dividend declaration be-
cause of the control which they exerted over the corporation was
mentioned as a collateral point; nevertheless, the court based its
decision on the broad language of the statute designed to deprive
the violator of all possible profit.'9 In its later decisions the Second
Circuit moved away from this automatic application of 16(b) and
began to inquire into the possibility for speculation in a given situa-
tion." Blau v. Lamb,2 a 1966 case, involved controlling insiders
"'According to Rheem Mfg. Co. v. Rheem, 295 F.2d 473, 475 (9th Cir.
1961), "[the excuses of various insider transactions which were presented
to Congressional Committees convinced the authors of the legislation that
civil liability and an objective measure of proof were indispensible ingre-
dients of an effective remedy for the proven vice." See Western Auto Supply
Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc. 348 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1965); B.T. Babbit, Inc.
v. Lachner, 332 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1964).
" In Ellerin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 270 F.2d 259 (2d Cir.
1959), the issue involved a series of stock, not convertible debentures.
135 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943).
17 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947).18Thomas G. Corcoran, the draftsman of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 used the term "crude rule of thumb" to describe 16(b). Hamilton,
Convertible Securities and Section 16(b): The End of an Era, 44 TEXAs L.
REV. 1447, 1448 n.6 (1966) [Hereinafter cited as Hamilton].
10 160 F.2d 984, 988 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947).
See Blau v. Lehman, 286 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1960), affirmed, 368 U.S.
403 (1962) ; In this opinion the court declared, "There is no rule of thumb,
nor would it be wise to attempt to formulate such a rule." 286 F.2d at 792.
Where the defendant became a director after his initial purchase and then
sold stock, the court applied its original test, stating: "it [the statute] must
be strictly construed in favor of the corporation and against any person who
makes profit dealing in the corporation stock." Adler v. Klawans. 267 F.2d
840, 846 (2d Cir. 1959). In Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1954),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954), involving a reclassification in which full
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who clearly had the power to misuse inside information. The court
asked whether there was the slightest opportunity to exercise that
power and stated:
[W] e reject the possible suggestion in the lower court's opinion
that the existence of an opportunity for speculative profits can
be inferred from the fact of control alone, because such a sug-
gestion is inconsistent with our responsibility to analyze the con-
version in order to determine whether the possibility of unfair
speculative profits might have existed at all even with full cor-
porate control.22
Other circuits interpreting the statute have followed the pattern
of the Second Circuit with one notable exception.28 In spite of the
Second Circuit's bold declaration in Blau v. Lamb, the court in
Chemical Fund seems to have expanded the test requiring "oppor-
tunity for speculation" by the requirement that in order for there
to be inside information for "speculation" there must be control
over the common stock, thus moving completely away from the
broad remedial application of the rule in Park & Tilford which
would make the officer, director, or ten percent beneficial holder
liable irrespective of actual knowledge, speculation or control.
As a practical matter, it is possible for the ten percent con-
vertible debenture holder to have inside information and to engage
in the abuses that rule 16(b) was intended to halt. An examina-
tion of three factors may aid in understanding this problem. In
the first place, the convertible debenture holder by the very nature
of the security has the opportunity for speculation and quick profit-
the evils prohibited by the statute. Many investors view convertible
issues as an opportunity for profit with small risk.24 In a sense
disclosure had been made, the court said that "[t]he reclassification at bar
could not possibly lend itself to the speculation encompassed by § 16(b)."
212 F.2d at 86. One opinion states, "And speculation, actual or potential,
is the only vice within the purview of § 16(b)." Blau v. Ogsbury, 210 F.2d
426, 427 (2d Cir. 1954); see also Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140, 142 (2d
Cir. 1949).
2 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967).
221d. at 521.
" In Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F. 2d 156, 166 (3d Cir. 1965), the
court applied the crude rule of thumb. For cases in which courts looked for
the speculative aspect, see Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1966); Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d
304 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965); Ferraiolo v. New-
man, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958).
" See generally, B. GRAHAm, D. DODD & S. COTTLE, SECURiTIES A sALYsiS
PRINcIPLE AND TEcHNiguE 602 (4th ed. 1962).
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these securities are favorable to both the investor and the corpora-
tion since the investor has the protection of a bond or preferred stock
plus the possibility of participation in any substantial rise in the
value of the common.25 Using the six months limitation, Congress
drew a practical line prohibiting profit made with the aid of inside
information while simultaneously permitting bona fide investment
by the insider.26 The person holding convertible debentures is in a
position analogous to the holder of preferred stock with warrants or
option privileges. Until the option is exercised, the holder does not
bear the same risk as the owner of the junior security even though
the market price of the security may at times be based upon the
value of the junior security." Similarly, until the convertible de-
benture holder converts, he does not have the same risk as the owner
of the underlying security. Although the court in Chemical Fund
treated the purchase of the convertible debentures as the purchase
of the underlying securities,2" a purchase of convertible securities is
not considered such for all purposes.29 As some authorities indi-
cate, the fungible nature of convertible securities makes them attrac-
tive for insider speculation in situations such as Chemical Fund
where the owner purchases the convertible security and offsets the
purchase with a transaction in the conversion security."0 Thus with
limited risk the convertible debenture holder can make considerable
profit through speculation. Therefore, the holder of ten percent of
the convertible debentures of a corporation should not be allowed
to escape the burden of section 16(b) unless he holds for the re-
quired six months necessary to make his purchase a bona fide in-
vestment.
In the second place, when compared with preferred stock, which
would certainly be a "class of equity security" within the scope of
16(b), there is little reason not to label convertible debentures as a
class of equity security. From the standpoint of control, the rights
' Id. at 601.
" Meeker and Cooney, The Problem of Definition in Determining Insider
Liabilities Under Section 16(b), 45 VA. L. REv. 949, 963 (1959) [Herein-
after cited as Meeker].
2 Id. at 964.
28 377 F.2d at 110. The court said that a convertible debenture was "an
equity security only because it can be converted," and that to determine if
ten percent of the convertible debentures would be ten percent of a class of
equity security, there must be a hypothetical conversion.
"' Hamilton 1491.
so Id. at 1488; Meeker 960-61.
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held by each are relatively equal. Although neither usually has
voting rights, some states permit the corporation to give the de-
benture holder voting and inspection rights."' While the preferred
stockholder can bring a derivative suit, the debenture holder can
sue in case of default in payment.3 2 Also the debenture holder has
a degree of control over the corporation through the restrictions
on corporate activities set forth in the indenture.8 3 Given these
circumstances, to include preferred stock under 16(b) and exclude
convertible debentures seems slightly inconsistent.
Finally, the holder of ten percent, and for -that matter lesser
amounts, of the convertible debentures in a corporation will probably
have access to inside information, especially if the debenture holder
is a large institutional investment company such as Chemical Fund.
Institutional investment companies are powerful, holding in the
aggregate approximately thirty to forty percent of the aggregate
value of all common stocks listed on the New York Stock Ex-
change.8 4 These companies can be quite helpful to portfolio com-
panies in locating needed capital and furnishing expert advice on
financing and management. As one authority points out, invest-
ment company officers and analysts are often in contact with the
officers and directors of the companies in which the investment
company has holdings.3 5 Such contact creates relationships of con-
fidence which permit the art of gentle persuasion and result in the
institutional investor being sought for advice."6 Thus, although this
authority contends that the investment company shuns favoritism
and direct involvment in the control of the portfolio companies,31
31E.g., Del. Code Ann. Title 8, § 221 (1953); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law
§ 518c (McKinney 1963).
" As a practical matter instead of suing, the debenture holder usually
reaches a compromise with the corporation, a point which illustrates the give
and take between the corporation and the debenture holders.
'"As stated in the XERox ANNUAL REPORT at 40 (1962), "Under the
terms of the several loan agreements and the indenture, varying restrictions
exist. At Dec. 31, 1962 among other conditions, the company was required
to limit investments in other subsidiaries and additional indebtedness and
to maintain consolidated working capital (as defined) equal to consolidated
aggregate indebtedness (as defined). In addition, restrictions exist on the
payment of cash dividends on common stock."
"' See generally, Brown, The Inzstitutional Investor As a Shareholder, in
CONFmENCE ON SECURiTiEs REouLATIoIs 209 (R. Mundheim ed. 1964).
3 Id. at 215-16.
so Id.
37 Id. at 213.
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they are in a strategic position for access to inside information which
may be valuable in speculation.
The use of ten percent in the statute is an arbitrary figure. From
the legislative history it is evident that Congress recognized the
possibility that the holder of less than ten percent of an equity
security might be in control of the corporation.3 It should be noted,
however, that in the statute Congress did not mention "control."
Instead it chose the arbitrary ten percent beneficial owner of any
class of any equity security, thereby making a distinction between
control and the use of inside information. In Gratz v. Claughton,39
Judge Hand emphasized the idea that the legislature may adopt
whatever measure is necessary to deal with the harm although
sometimes it applies to situations where the evil is not present.
4 1
For authority that the legislature's intent in passing the Act was
for the convertible debentures to be an equity security only in rela-
tion to the conversion security, the court in Chemical Fund cited
the legislative hearings pointing out that in the original draft bond-
holders were mentioned specifically, but were omitted in the final
bill.4 1 As one writer has stated:
What constitutes an equity security has been the subject of con-
siderable difference of opinion. Any definition must be couched
in broad language if it is to be applicable to the infinite variety
of security issues and is to thwart ingenious attempts to escape
its terms.
42
" 78 CONGRESSIONAL REcomn 8037 (1934) (Mr. Lea answering Mr.
Pettingill's motion to strike out "beneficial owner" in the bill) :
I recognize the fact that the five percent [later changed to ten percent]
line is an arbitrary one. It is variable in its effects in reference to
different corporations. As to all corporations listed on the great ex-
changes of the country, five percent represents an important part of the
stock of such corporations. It is so commonly the case that a man
who owns a large amount of stock, but nothing like a majority, con-
trols the directors of the corporation that the committee thought it
was advisable to require these large stockholders who may be traffick-
ing in the stock of the corporation to reveal the facts.
Mr. Rayburn, speaking before the House, said: "We know, however, that
in the case of any corporation having widely scattered stockholders the con-
centration of five or ten or twenty or thirty percent of stock ownership is
control; they can always get the proxies." Id. at 8038.
" 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1951).
"If the plaintiff had the burden of proving that the defendant had a
bargaining advantage, the purpose of the statute would be defeated. Id. at
49.
"377 F.2d 107, 111 n. 6 (2d Cir. 1967).
"Cook 393.
1967]
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The definition of an equitable security as "any stock or similar se-
curity; or any security convertible. . . . into such a security .. .,,43
could represent a compromise position in which Congress recognized
the possibility that holders of convertible debentures might engage
in speculation and thus fall within the policy of the statute.
Interpreting section 16(b) in cases from Smolowe through
Chemical Fund, the court used three basic tests4 -- the automatic
"crude rule of thumb," the opportunity for speculation, and finally
control. The validity of these tests must be governed by the policy
and purpose of the statute-to prevent the unfair use of inside in-
formation. The court in Chemical Fund held that ten percent of the
convertible debentures alone would not constitute a class of equity
security. In light of the purpose of the statute, did the court reach
a result in harmony with the statutory objectives by basing liability
on control-actual or potential? An affirmative answer to this
question is doubtful. The facts disclose that an institutional invest-
ment company holding convertible debentures could have access to
inside information and could use this information for speculation to
the detriment of outside shareholders.45 Furthermore, the legisla-
tive history reveals that Congress drew an arbitrary line of ten
percent and did not intend control as the criterion. Thus had the
Second Circuit used the Blau test-opportunity for speculation-
the decision would probably have been more in keeping with the
legislative purpose and policy of the statute. Section 16(b) is
remedial, not penal, and the interpretation must be given which is
most consistent with the legislative intent.4 6 As one writer has
commented: "[I]n view of the history and apparent purpose of this
legislation, the fundamental consideration in all doubtful cases should
be 'not whether the defendant actually used inside knowledge to
profit, but rather whether the situation was one in which such in-
'S Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(11) (1934).
"The term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
certificate of interest or participation ... " Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1934).
"For commentary on the various tests applied by the courts see Hamilton
1454-58.
' For a discussion of the ability of institutional investors to control the
market, See generally, Henderson, Institutional Investors in the Equity Mar-
ket, in CONFRMMNCE ON SEcURITIEs REGULATION 136 (R. Mundheim ed.
1964).
"
8 Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir. 1959).
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side knowledge could have been advantageously used.' "" To re-
quire control in terms of ten percent of the common stock diminishes
the effectiveness of the statute. The statute itself vests the power
in the Securities Exchange Commission to exempt certain securities
and transactions, 4s and exceptions to the statute should not be cre-
ated by narrow judicial interpretation 9 One authority is of the
opinion that "the express purpose of preventing the unfair use of
inside information might suggest an application of the statute to
all cases which may come literally within its scope." 50  By virtue
of the ten percent and six months arbitrary cut off points, the statute
is already limited, and the court should not limit further what is
remedial legislation5 when, as in Chemical Fund, -there is the slight-
est possibility for unfair use of inside information.
SARAH E. PARKER
Torts-Dignity As a Legally Protectable Interest
A recent New Jersey decision' presents the question of what
injury, if any, has been suffered by a mother who has been denied
the opportunity to obtain an abortion. Plaintiffs, a defective in-
fant and his parents, brought a malpractice action against the
mother's obstetricians alleging that they negligently assured Mrs.
Glietman that her recent illness of German measles would not
affect the infant then in gestation.2 The basis of plaintiffs' claim
was that defendants' repeated assurances induced Mrs. Glietman
""Painter, The Evolving Role of Section 16(b), 62 MIcE. L. REv. 649, 678(1964).
,8 Cook 387.
'9 Hamilton 1455.
8 Meeker 958.81Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959). As the opinion states,
"One can speculate on whether the moral or ethical values are altered by the
passage of 24 hours, but the statute makes an honest if not an honorable man
out of the insider in that period." Id. at 845. A line had to be drawn some-
where by the lawmakers as in any other area governed by statute.
'Glietman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
'At present it is well established that rubella virus can cause mal-
formations of the eye (cataract and microphthalmia); internal ear
(congenital deafness due to destruction of the Organ of Corti) ; heart
(persistence of the ductus arteriosus as well as atrial and -ventricular
septal defects) ; and occasionally of the teeth (enamel layer). The
virus may also be responsible for some cases of brain abnormalties
and mental retardation.
J. LANGMAN, MEDIcAL EMBRYOLOGY 73 (1963). In the principle case the
infant had substantial defects in sight, hearing, and speech.
1§671
